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interests in more ways than we have time to name in detail, and
might save some litigation and much heart-burning and uneasiness
to all parties concerned. We have noticed in some of the states,
that while all such questions affecting steam railways are referred
to the county commissioners, the provision does not include street
railways. We think it far more important that such a provision
should embrace the latter than the former, inasmuch as street railways occupy the highways throughout their whole extent, while
steam railways are only allowed to intersect them at such points
as are indispensable.
I.F.R.

In the District Court of the United States for the District of Wisconsin.-In -Equity.
ASAHEL EMIGH VS. SELAH CHAMBERLAIN.
An assignment of the revenues of a railroad, and the use of the rolling stock, by
the Company, to a preferred creditor, is not a transfer of corporate entity or
property. And the use, by the assignee, of cars -which have attached patented
brakes, does not render him liable to account for infringement upon the patent
right, when the exclusive use of the brakes had been licensed to the Company
by the patentee. The assignee used the brakes as an agent of the Company,
and not as a purchaser; and his use of them, in the name of the Company, was
exclusive, in the meaning of the license.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
J.-The complainant, as the assignee for the State of
Wisconsin, of a patent right to Francis A. Stevens for a combination and arrangement of levers, link-rods, and shoes or rubbers,
whereby each wheel of both trucks of a car on a railway is retarded
with uniform force when the brake is put in operation, brings this
bill against defendant for operating, or causing to be operated, the
La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad in this State, by the use of bars
with the improved brakes. The defendant sets up a deed from the
patentee, Francis A. Stevens, given previous to complainant's assignment, to the said railroad company, whereby, in consideration of six
hundred dollars to him paid in full satisfaction, he licensed and conveyed to the company the full and exclusive right and liberty of
using the said improvement on any or all their own cars, over any
MILLER,
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part of their road. Defendant further shows that, by an instrument
of writing, called by him a lease or mortgage, the company granted
to him, for an indefinite time, its entire railroad and road route,
together with right of way and depot grounds, and all buildings
and property of every description, including the rolling stock. He
to operate the road and receive all the revenues, and out of them
defray all expenses of operating the road, purchasing additional
rolling stock, paying interest of liens, and the residue to apply
towards a claim of his own against the company. And when his
claim should be paid, either by the company or out of the revenues
of the road, the property to revert to the company. The company
was using the patented improvement upon the cars that passed to
Chamberlain, and which he continued to use. Chamberlain, after
operating the road for some time, under the deed of the company,
-was superseded by an order of this court appointing a receiver.
The assignment to complainant excepts the license to the company. Whether Stevens would be the proper person to claim
damages is not made a question by the pleadings. Can the com,
plainant require defendant to account to him, is the only question
submitted.
The deed of Stevens to the company licenses and conveys the full
and exclusive right of using the improvement on their own cars.
There is no power granted the company to rest the right in any
person, by conveyance or otherwise. It is simply a license.
In order to test the right set up by defendant, we must bear in
mind that the railroad company is incorporated by a law of the
State, and to such Stevens made the license, and as such the company made the assignment to defendant. The duties imposed upon
the company by its charter, were not fulfilled by th~e construction
of the road. Important franchises were granted the company to
enable it to provide the facilities to communication and intercourse
required for the public convenience. Corporate management and
control over these were prescribed, and corporate responsibility for
their insufficiency was provided, as a remuneration to the community for the legislative grant. The corporation cannot absolve itself
from the performance of its obligation without the consent of the
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legislature. Defendant could only operate the road under and subordinate to the charter of the company; and not he but the company was liable for the performance of all the corporate duties to
the public. He only could perform those duties in the name of
the company. The franchises of the company were not, and could
not be vested in him. He was nominally substituted for the company in the active use of the road and property.
The corporation, as a creature of the law, must use the franchises granted it by means of officers of its own appointment, either
directly or indirectly. Railroad Co. vs. Winans, 17 Howard, 80
-39, and cases cited.
It is contended on the part of complainant, that defendant was
a mortgagee in possession, and as such, he held under a title, in
the nature of a conveyance from the company. This court has
uniformly considered the~rolling stock of a railroad company as a
fixture not liable to levy and sale apart from the realty. And we
have placed liens by mortgage of those companies on the same
footing as of individuals. In this State the mortgagor is the owner
of the premises, until a sale is made in pursuance of a decree of
court. The note and mortgage are choses in action. Sheldon and
Wife vs. Sill, 8 Howard, 441. The mortgagor may put the mortgagee in possession of the mortgaged premises until the debt is
paid by receipt of rents and issues; but the mortgagee would not
hold adversely to, but under the mortgagor.
Technically, the deed under which defendant held possession of
the road, was not a mortgage. The defeasance does not make it a
mortgage; as, without it, the company would have the equitable
right to regain possession upon discharging its debts to defendant,
and to require him to account. The deed is an assignment of the
revenues of the road to a preferred creditor, with the privilege of
using the road and property of the company for the mutual interest
of the debtor and creditor. The rolling stock and the road, at the
date of the assignment to defendant, were subject to mortgages,
whose accruing interest he became obliged to pay out of the revenues of the road. If he replenished the stock, he did so from the
same source. The company being insolvent, devised the scheme
14
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of placing their property in the hands of defendant, for the purpose of completing the road to La Crosse, of paying the annual
interest of liens, and of satisfying his claim.
Although this court pronounced the arrangement fraudulent and
void as to creditors, yet it was valid between the parties, and this
suit can be defended under it. The deed to defendant is not a
conveyance of the property. The rolling stock was the property
of the company in defendant's hands. It might as well be claimed
that the receiver appointed by this court should account for the
use of the patented improvement, which, I presume, will not be
pretended. The receiver holds the property of the company for
the benefit of its creditors. Defendant did so with consent of the
company, for the same purpose. In both cases, the company is
the owner of the cars with the patented improvenent attached.
The company did not divest itself, by its deed to defendant, of its
corporate entity or property.
Defendant is to be viewed in the light of an agent and trustee.
He was a mere substitute for the company, and his use of the cars
was the same as that of the company, and exclusive as to third
persons or other interests in the meaning of the license.
The bill will be dismissed.

In the Suyreme Court of Connecticut.-October Term, 1861.
THE BRIDGEPORT BANK VS. THE NEW YORK AND NEW HAVEN RAILROAD COMPANY.
R. & G. L. Schuyler being the owners of one hundred and sixty shares in the
defendant's company, of which R. Schuyler was the Register and Transfer
Agent, the latter in 1849 delivered to the plaintiffs, as collateral security for a
debt due by him, certificates for ninety of those shares, with a blank power. No
I We are indebted to the kindness of Mr. Justice Ellsworth for this important and
valuable opinion, for which we desire to express our grateful acknowledgments.
We hope, at some future time, to discuss the questions involved, and others germain
to them, more in detail than our present leisure or space will allow.-Eds. Am.
Law Beg.
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application for a transfer on the books of the company, as required by the charter,
was made until 1854, when it was discovered that R. S. had been guilty of a
fraudulent over issue of the stock of the company to his firm, but there was no
evidence that any of this spurious stock had passed out of the hands of the firm
before the delivery of the/genuine certificates to the plaintiffs. The company
subsequently refused to allow the transfer of the latter. Held,
1. Burden of proof.-It is incumbent upon the defendants to show, if such be the
fact, that these certificates do not represent the genuine stock of the company,
that being a fact more exclusively in their power to prove.
2. Plaintiff' title.-The plaintiffs are to be regarded as the first and only equitable
purchasers and owners of ninety of the one hundred and sixty shares of genuine
stock held by Schuyler.
3. Plaintiffs' title.not lost by delay.-The bonafide holders of such certificates had a
right to rely upon them, as securing to the owners the shares which they represented, against all transfer to other parties.
4. Notice to the Compann.-The knowledge of Schuyler that these certificates were
held by bona fide purchasers, for value, was notice to the company, while he
acted as their transfer agent in registering the transfers to subsequent parties,
and thus affected them, constructively, with the fraud of their agent, and thereby
avoided the effect of such transfers as between the plaintiffs and the company,
and rendered them liable to make good the plaintiffs' loss thereby sustained.
5. Semble.-It is by no means certain that the transfers registered are to be regarded
as having operated upon the plaintiffs' shares.
6. Blank transfer.-lBlank powers of attorney, for transferring stock, although
under seal, may be filled up at the convenience of the transferree, and thus operate as of their date.
7. Lex loci.-Such being the settled law of the State of New York where this instrument was intended to take effect, will remove all question as to its validity, even
if we admit that the law of the place where it was executed is otherwise.

The plaintiffs, in 1849, took from Robert Schuyler two certificates of stock in the defendants' company, one for fifty and the
other for forty shares, as collateral security for the balance due on
account against him. The bank held these certificates, without
transfers, until 1854, when the Schuyler frauds were discovdred.
They then demanded of the company a transfer of the shares, which
was refused, and this suit was brought. At the time the bank took
these certificates, Schuyler owned one hundred and sixty shares of
the genuine stock of the company; but in the meantime he had
issued, as register and transfer agent, an immense number of spurious shares, which he had transferred in a similar manner tb other
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parties, and these parties had obtained the transfer of these genuine
shares into their own names on the books of the company,
any demand made by the plaintiffs, or any formal notice
company of their holding such certificates with transfers
in blank. The other facts in the case sufficiently appear

before
to the
signed
in the

opinion of the Court, which was delivered by
ELLSWORTH, J.-Several questions of the gravest character have
been raised in this case, and have been argued with great learning
and ability. Most of them we do not find it necessary to decide, as
there is one which, in our opinion, is essentially decisive of the case.
Thus, we need not determine whether, if the stock in question had
been found to be spurious, there could be a recovery for the refusal
of the defendants to allow a transfer of it, nor whether, if the transfer had been made, it would in that case have been of any benefit
to the plaintiffs; nor need we detcrmine whether the form of action
adopted, is the proper one for trying the question of the liability
of the defendants, for the frauds of their transfer agent in issuing
fraudulent certificates of stock, nor whether such liability exists.
We place our decision upon the ground that the defendants, upon
whom the burden of proof upon this point clearly rests, do not show
that the certificates held by the plaintiffs do not represent genuine
stock, as, in the absence of proof to the contrary, they must certainly be taken as doing. The burden of proof upon this point, we
say, is upon the defendants. Their agent, appointed for the express
duty of issuing certificates to the holders of stock, issued these certificates in the usual form, and for the purposes prescribed by their
rules, and it is to be presumed, certainly in favor of these plaintiffs,
who had become bona fide holders of the certificates upon the credit
which their official character gave them, that R. &G. L. Schuyler
had, at the time, good stock to which they would apply, which
presumption must stand until the defendants show, as they can do,
if such was the fact, that there was no stock standing in their names
which could be represented by the certificates. When we say that
the defendants could show how the actual fact was, we mean merely
that they had the power to show it, and do not intend to express
an opinion upon the question, controverted in the case, whether
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they would be allowed to show it, against the certificate of their
own officer.
The defendants have not shown that, at the time when the plaintiffs took their certificates, there was not genuine stock held by the
Schuylers sufficient to answer to them. On the contrary, it appears
that at that time the Schuylers held one hundred and sixty shares
of good stock, which stood in their names, and which they could
have legally transferred to the plaintiffs or any other purchaser.
If there were nothing more in the case, it would be clear that the
defendants ought to have allowed the ninety shares, covered by
the certificates held by the plaintiffs, to be transferred to them.
But here the defendants come in and show that, before the
plaintiffs received their certificates, Robert Schuyler, their transfer
agent, and one of the firm of R. & G. L. Schuyler, had issued to
the firm, in his official capacity, certificates of stock to the amount
of four hundred and ninety shares, beyond the one hundred and
sixty shares of good stock held by the firm, and thus they say that
the genuine stock had been all exhausted before the plaintiffs' certificates were issued. It is, however, not found, and the judge
expressly states that it was his intention not to find, that these
certificates for the four hundred and ninety shares had ever passed
out of the hands of the Schuylers. It cannot be presumed, in the
absence of all evidence on the subject, that those certificates had
been transferred to other parties; much less can it be presumed
that they had been so transferred upon a valuable consideration,
and to bona fide holders. So far as we can see, therefore, and as
upon the finding, we are to presume, the plaintiffs, when they
received their certificates, were the first and only equitable purchasers and owners of ninety out of the one hundred and sixty
shares, held by the Schuylers.
The fact, which is found, and which has been pressed upon us by
the counsel for the defendants, as one of great importance, that
the greater part of these certificates were afterwards, in the years
1849, 1850, and 1851, surrendered to the railroad company by the
Schuylers, and cancelled, and new certificates issued in their place
to other parties, can not, we think, affect the case. We regard the
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right of the plaintiffs to the stock represented by their certificates,
as one already vested, and which, under the by-laws of the company, which forbade the transfer of any stock except upon the surrender of the certificate representing it, could not be defeated so
long as they held the certificates. The plaintiffs, relying upon the
by-laws of the company, and the provisions of the certificates themselves, had retained and carefully preserved the certificates as the
appropriate and conclusive evidence of their right to the stock.
The defendants cannot set aside their own by-laws at their pleasure.
The defendants, however, say, that the plaintiffs acquired only an
equitable title to this stock, and that, though such a title will be
recognised and protected within reasonable limits, yet, that a duty
devolved upon the plaintiffs themselves in the matter, which they
have neglected, and by which neglect they have lost their right to
the stock. This duty, they say, was either to procure.a transfer
of the stock within a reasonable time, (which they say that four
years clearly was not,) or else to give timely notice to the railroad
company that the stock had been equitably assigned to them. They
say that it is like the case of the grantee of real estate, who fails
to get his deed recorded until after a bona fide purchaser has taken
a later conveyance of the land, or of the vendee of personal property, who does not take a delivery of it, and loses his title to it as
against a bonafide purchaser, who afterwards finds it in the possession of the vendor, and buys and takes a delivery of it. They say
that, admitting the stock to be genuine, so that the equitable title
acquired from the Schuylers was a good one, and entitled them to a
transfer of ninety shares of genuine stock, if they had within a
reasonable time demanded such transfer, or given notice of their
equitable title, yet that the Schuylers retained the.legal power to
sell this same stock to other parties, who would acquire a legal and
therefore a preferable title if they should first get a transfer of it,
and that it was the duty of the defendants to allow a transfer of
whatever good stock they found standing in the name of the Schuylers, upon the presentation and surrender of a certificate for the
same, so long as they had no notice of any claim of other parties
upon the stock; and that whatever claim the plaintiffs have for
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damages upon any body, is not a claim upon them, but, as in the
case supposed of the vendee, who had been defrauded by a later
sale of the property by the vendor to another party, is a claim
upon the Schuylers, their vendors, who have defrauded them; they,
the defendants, being, as they say, merely custodians of the property, holding it subject to the order of the Schuylers, who were
the owners of it, and having no other duty to perform than to see
that the party calling for it had a proper order from the owners.
We cannot assent to this claim of the defendants. We cannot
regard them as mere custodians of the property, with no other duty
with regard to it than that which has been suggested. By the
very form of their certificates, specially prescribed, and specially
adapted to the purpose of their negotiation, and which were issued
by their own agent, and by their by-law, providing that no stock
represented by such certificate should be transferred until the certificate itself was surrendered, they had assumed a duty far more
extepsive than that which they now assert. The bona fide holders
of such certificates had a right to rely upon the certificate, under
the circumstances, as securing to them the stock which they represented, against all transfers to otherparties.
But there is a further, and we think decisive reason, why the
defendants cannot avail themselves of this transfer of the stock to
other parties. These very transfers to other parties were a fraud
upon the plaintiffs. This fraud is wholly distinct from the fraud of
their transfer agent in issuing spurious certificates. The agent who
issued the certificates might be a different person entirely from the
agent who superintended the transfers, and it will make the point
clearer to suppose him to have been so. Now their transfer agent
knew, when he allowed these transfers ,to other parties, that the
stock had already been sold to a prior purchaser, who held a legal
certificate for it, and that it was a fraud on that party to allow
the stock to be transferred to other parties, so long as the certificate
was not surrendered. Their transfer agent, in allowing these transfers, was acting precisely within the scope of his official power, and
his knowledge andfraud are, therefore, the knowledge andfraud of
the defendants themselves. We are supposing, in this view of the
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case, that the very stock in question has been transferred to other
parties. This is the claim of the defendants, and we therefore, for
the sake of the argument, so regard the fact. If the same stock
was in fact transferred to other parties, then their transfer agent
knew that he was committing a fraud on the plaintiffs in allowing
the transfer, for he knew that the certificate representing that stock
had not been surrendered, but was still outstanding in the hands
of a bonafide purchaser. If, however, this precise stock was not
transferred to other parties, but those transfers are to be regarded
as operating on other stock, or as having no operation at all, then
this stock is still left untransferred, and the defendants are clearly
liable for having refused to allow a transfer of it to the plaintiffs.
We are by no means sure that this latter supposition may not be
a correct one. The subsequent transfers do not purport to embrace
these shares, while Schuyler was constantly creating new shares,
(or what purported to be such), and transferring and re-transferring
them, and issuing certificates for them, at his pleasure. These
transfers and certificates may, perhaps, be regarded as having
embraced only other stock, and as leaving the stock in question
untransferred. We merely suggest this supposition, as it is not
necessary to the general view of the case which we take.
But if the defendants are right in claiming that they are protected in transfers made to other parties, where they have no notice
of equitable transfers to prior furchasers, yet this principle very
clearly could not avail them here. The plaintiffs, it is said, should
have given them notice of their equitable title. But how should
they have given such notice? Why, only to that officer of the
company whose duties related to the transfer of their stock; that
is, to their transfer agent, Robert Schuyler, himself. But Robert
Schuyler already had full knowledge of the fact, for he was the
very party who sold the stock to the plaintiffs; and though a distinction may be made between the knowledge which he had as an
individual, in which capacity he was acting in selling the stock,
and the official knowledge which he would have acquired by a formal
notice given to him as transfer agent of the company, yet, practically, this distinction is very unimportant. When afterwards he
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came to allow the transfer of this stock to other parties, he was
acting officially, and he then l4ad knowledge, and acted with full
knowledge, that the plaintiffs had acquired an equitable title to
the stock. Notice of such an equitabletitle is never required to
be formally given. Actual knowledge, however acquired, is enough
to affect an individual, and we entertain no doubt that this knowledge of Robert Schuyler is to be regarded as the knowledge of
their transfer agent, and as the knowledge of the defendants. It
is to be observed, too, that Robert Schuyler was not merely the
transfer agent of the defendants, but was, at the same time, the
president of the company and one of its directors.
Two questions .remain to be considered. One is, whether the
plaintiffs have proved a sufficient demand upon the defendants for a
transfer of the stock, to enable them to sustain their suit. That a
demand was necessary is admitted by the plaintiffs. The first demand
made by the plaintiffs' cashier, at the office of the company in New
York, on the morning of July 5th, 1854, the day after the great
fraud of Schuyler had been discovered, was not, in our opinion, sufficient. It appears that there was no transfer agent in the office,
and that the company had appointed none in the place of Schuyler,
who had just fled from the country, and the confusion incident to
the developments then being made, fully justified the defendants in
temporarily closing their transfer books, and in deferring the appointment of a new transfer agent. Such a course was necessary to
the safety of the company, and was absolutely required by the condition of its affairs. As there was no absolute refusal to allow a
transfer at some future time, we are inclined to the opinion that it
was not such a refusal as to give the plaintiffs a right of action.
The second demand, however, made by Mr. Buckingham in behalf
of the plaintiffs, shortly before the commencement of the present
suit, we think was sufficient. It was made at a proper time and in
a proper form, and it is expressly found that Mr. Buckingham, in
making it, was acting as the agent and attorney of the plaintiffs.
It is said by the defendants that Mr. Buckingham could not make
a legal demand, because he had entered into a champertous, and
therefore illegal and void contract with the plaintiffs for the prose-
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cution of this claim, and that this demand was made under tha
contract, as a part of the service which he was to render in the
prosecution of the claim, and for the purpose of bringing the suit.
But we regard the demand as unaffected by the illegality of the
contract for the prosecution of the suit. It preceded the institution of the suit, and was not, properly, any part of it. He was
none the less acting as the agent of the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs have since ratified his act, if the authority given was defective
before, by abandoning the champertous contract, assuming the
benefit of the demand made by him, and proceeding with the suit
on their own account. The question is purely one of authority,
and we are satisfied that the authority was sufficient. It is a point
of very little importance to these defendants, only at the most
rendering another demand and suit necessary, and is too merely
technical to deserve very much consideration. The defendants
deny all right of the plaintiffs to a transfer of the stock, and upon
any demand whatever, would have refused to allow the transfer,
and we should not, except upon a positive necessity, send the
plaintiffs out of court to make another useless demand.
The remaining question is, whether the blank power of attorney
given by R. & G. L. Schuyler to the plaintiffs, under seal, at the
time they took the certificates, was sufficient, and whether the
plaintiffs could afterwards fill it up and use it as a valid power,
taking effect at the time it bears date. We think that it was sufficient, and that they could fill it up and use it, although it was
under seal. We are satisfied that it has been the practice of this
railroad company from the first, as it is of many other corporations, to their own great convenience and that of the public, to
allow blank powers of attorney to be filled up as circumstances
should require; and such a practice may give a construction to,
and may even qualify, and vary, a by-law of a corporation. But
without going so far as this, we feel no hesitation in holding the
power to be sufficient in blank, and we are satisfied that in this
country the rule of law is, that a blank power of attorney, although
under seal, may be filled up in conformity with the agreement of
the parties, and when so filled up, takes effect as of its date. The

BRIDGEPORT BANK vs. N. Y. & N. H. RAILROAD CO.

219

rule we suppose to be otherwise in England, where the old principle
of the common law on the subject is more rigorously applied, and
where the policy of the stamp system influences their decisions.
The cases in this country in which the view taken by us is supported, are numerous, and may be found in Redfield on Railways,
see. 35; and Mr. Redfield, himself a jurist-of much learning and
of long experience on the bench, gives it as his opinion, that the
doctrine of the American cases is decidedly preferable to that of
the English. Nor can any reason be assigned, which is founded in
good sense, and is not entirely technical, why a blank, in an instrument under seal, may not be filled up by the party receiving
it after it is executed, as well as any other contract in writing,
where the parties have so agreed at the time. In either case, the
contract, when the blank has been filled, expresses the exact agreement of the parties, and nothing but an extreme technical view,
derived from the ancient law of England, can justify the making
of any distinction between them. Such a technical distinction is
little suited to the usages and necessities of modern commerce, for
credit, among merchants, and facilities for making it available in
their transactions, are a most important element in its character,
however unimportant they may have been in a state of society
where commerce was little known, where seals were a substitute
for signatures, and where lords and vassals, alike, could not write
their own names.
We do not find it necessary to go out of the record to learn
what course this railroad company has always pursued with regard
to the transfers of their stock, under powers of attorney. It is
found that the certificates held by the plaintiffs are in the form
prescribed by the by-laws of the company, and are such as the
defendants have uniformly sanctioned and approved. These -certificates, as they came from the defendants' hands, contained, on
the same piece of paper, and immediately under the certificate, a
blank assignment of the stock, and a blank power of attorney for
its transfer. The defendants must therefore be held to have intended and agreed, that whoever should present the certificate so
issued, with the assignment and power of attorney executed in
blank, should be entitled to fill up the blanks with his own name,
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and to have a transfer of the stock made to himself on the books
of the company. The certificate, accompanied by the assignment
and power of attorney thus executed, in blank, has perhaps a
species of negotiability, although of a peculiar character, but one
necessary to the public convenience, and to which it is no objection that the instrument has a seal.
But we feel relieved from embarrassment in holding this power
sufficient, by the fact that the transfer was to be made under it in
the State of New York, where, it is admitted by the defendants'
counsel, the law is settled by the highest judicial authority in favor
of the validity of a blank power of attorney. As the power was
to be executed there, it is certainly sufficient that it was a valid
one under the law prevailing there; and a citizen from Connecticut, who has taken his certificate here, has certainly the same
rights under it in New York that a citizen of that State would have
under a certificate taken there.
We will only remark, in conclusion, that the tendency of judicial decisions and of legislation in this country, is to do away, so
far as can be done without too violent a departure from ancient
rules, with distinctions in the character and effect of written instruments founded upon the mystical power of a seal. The legislature
of this State has, repeatedly, by confirmatory acts, enacted that
instruments purporting to be specialties, but from which the seal
had been omitted, should be as good and valid as if sealed, and has
further enacted that the letters L. S. or the letter ,S. or some
equivalent, in the place where a seal is ordinarily affixed, shall be
deemed to be a seal. Similar enactments we have no doubt are
common in other States. In these circumstances we feel much
more inclined to relax the strictness of the common law with regard to sealed instruments, than to adhere to it.
We have taken no notice of any security held by the plaintiffs,
as affecting the amount of damages to be recovered, because no
allusion was made to it in the argument. Independently of that,
we advise the superior court to render judgment for the plaintiffs
for the value of the stock in question at the time of the last demand, which is agreed to be sixty dollars per share, with interest
from that date.

SCOBY vs. GIBSON.

In the Supreme Court of Indiana, _February, 1862.
JOHN S. SCOBY vs. ISRAEL T. GIBSON.

The Indiana statute of 1861, which provides that in all cases of sales by the sheriff
on execution, after its passage, the sheriff shall not give the purchaser a deed for,
and possession of the property sold, but only a certificate entitling him to a deed
and possession in one year from the sale, if the property is not redeemed in the
manner therein provided, is unconstitutional, so far as it supplies to sales on
Judgments upon contracts existing at, and before its passage.

Appeal from the Decatur Circuit Court.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
PERKINS, J.-The only question in this case is, whether the
redemption law of 1861 (Acts of 1861, p. 79), is to be held applicable to sales on judgments upon contracts existing at, and before
its passage. The act provides that in all cases of sales by the
sheriff, &c., on execution, &c., after its passage, the sheriff shall
not give the purchaser a deed for, and possession of, the property
sold, but only a certificate entitling him to a deed and possession
in one year'from the sale, if the property is not redeemed.
In legal effect, what is the operation of this statute ?
It is to prohibit, for one year, the absolute sale of property for
the purpose of collecting a debt due. In place of such sale, it
authorizes the sheriff to make a contract for the absolute sale of
the property after the lapse of one year's time, unless such contract shall be defeated by the performance of a specified condition,
namely, the return of the purchase-money paid,-with interest, by
the expiration of said year. It authorizes, in other words, the
sheriff, in legal effect, to mortgage the debtor's land for one year,
to any one who will advance the amount required by law upon its
appraised value, the mortgage to become absolute,and free from
equity of redemption at the end of a year, if the money advanced
is not refuided, with interest.
What is the influence of such a statute upon the collection of
debts ? Its tendency is to delay. It embarrasses the collection,
because it deprives the creditor of the right which the law, at the
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date of his contract, gave him, of selling the absolute fee of the
debtor's real estate.
And the question is, if held to operate upon existing contracts,
will the act conflict with that clause of Section 10, Art. 1, of the
Constitution of the United States, which declares that no State
shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts? What
constitutes such a law?
A few years ago, the Legislature passed a law forbidding the
sheriff to sell the debtor's property unless the half of the appraised
value was bid for it. Before that time property had sold for what
it would bring. The appraisement law was held not to operate on
existing contracts, and why ? Not because it forbade the sale of
property for their enforcement-it did not do that; but because it
deprived the sheriff of the absolute power to sell the fee, at all
events. It left him but the conditional power to sell, the power
of selling if he could get a certain price, not otherwise. It tended
to embarrass, and thereby to prevent, the sale, and thus to delay
the collection of the debt.
So, too, awhile ago, an additional stay of execution was given
upon judgments, by an act of the Legislature. This act was held
inoperative as to existing contracts, and why? Not because it
cancelled obligations, but because it delayed their collection by the
process of the law. This was the natural, necessary, and intended
effect of both of the above mentioned statutes, and it is, also, of
the redemption law. If the decisions upon the operation of the
first two named laws were right, and we are bound by them, then,
beyond doubt, the redemption law in question must be held inoperative upon existing contracts. See the cases collected in Gavin
& Hord's edition of R. S., Vol. 1, p. 10.
It is said that where a purchaser bids off the property, and pays
the money under the present law, he has no right to object to the
redemption, as he buys in face of the law; but it is a maxim
that every man is bound to know the law, and act accordingly.
Hence, the man who buys does so knowing that the law will not,
and cannot operate to deprive him of his deed and title; and he
must be taken to make his bid in the light of, and influenced by
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such knowledge. And further, the law must be uniform in its
operation alike upon all.
Again, it is urged that the Legislature has a right to change
legal remedies, that it is only the obligation of contracts that cannot be impaired, and it is claimed the redemption law affects the
remedy only.
It is freely admitted that the State, for convenience, may change
legal remedies, may vary the times of holding courts, shift jurisdiction from one to another, change forms of action, of pleadings
and of process, &c., and such legislation may, incidentally, delay
somewhat the collection of given debts, but such is not the purpose of this legislation. And while its validity is admitted, it may
also be asserted that the Legislature cannot, under the guise of
legislating upon the remedy, intentionally, in effect, impair the
obligation of contracts; and it may be further laid down, that any
to the remedy, which deprives a
legislation, professedly directed
/
party of one substantially as efficient as that existing at the
making of the contract, does impair the obligation of the contract.
Ind. Digest, p. 271, sec. 55. In Grantl/'8 Lessee vs. Ewing, 3
How. (U. S.) p. 707, Judge Catron, in delivering the opinion of
the court, said:
"This court held, in Bronson vs. Kenzie, 1 How. 819, that the
right, and a remedy substantially in accordance with the right,
were equally parts of the contract, secured by the laws of the
State where it was made." See, also, 1 Blackf., by Peele and
Davis, p. 220, note; also, 4 Cal. Rep. 127; 5 Id. 401; 1 Manning
(Mich.) R. 869.
It may, perhaps, be questioned whether the redemption law in
question is properly classed as legislation touching the remedy.
It does not operate upon terms of court, upon pleading or practice
i.n obtaining judgment, nor upon process upon judgment: But,
however classed, it restricts and curtails the right of the judgment
creditor in relation to subjecting the property of the debtor to
execution for the payment of given debts. It may not diminish
the fund of the debtor applicable to the payment of his debts, nor
did the appraisement law, nor the stay law; but it limits, curtails,
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and materially embarrasses the right of the creditor in given
cases, in subjecting the entire amount of the debtor's property
subject to execution, to the payment of the debt in suit. Curran
vs. Arkansas, 15 How. (U. S.) p. 304.
This court judicially knows, and it must decide the question as
one of law, upon its judicial knowledge, that the right to sell at
once the entire, absolute fee simple in land, and give the purchaser
possession, is worth more, will be more likely to realize the amount
of money due on a particular judgment, than the restricted right
of selling a conditional interest in such land; and that, hence, the
taking away of such absolute right may tend to defeat, in given
cases, the collection of debts due. A purchaser will give more for
an absolute title than a conditional one; and few moneyed men
will be found to buy conditional titles as mere investments, which
may be defeated by simply refunding them their money, with ten
per cent., when a much higher rate may be obtained on the most
select security.
But suppose the act in question is to be regarded as directed to
the remedy. Still, as we have seen, an act thus directed may
impair the obligation of contracts. It is very doubtful whether
those cases, decided upon the general rule of international law,
that the lex loci governs as to interpretation and effect to be given
to the terms of a contract, and the lex fori as to the remedy upon
it, are safe guides to rely upon in determining the force to be
accorded to the constitutional provision quoted. These express
constitutional restrictions upon the legislative power, are peculiar
to American governments, and must be interpreted in accordance
with the spirit and purpose of their adoption. Stay and relief
laws, enacted by various States before the adoption of the Federal
Constitution, were, in part at least, the evil which they were designed to prevent the repetition of. The learned Chancellor De
Saussure, of South Carolina, who lived in the times mentioned, and
who went upon the equity bench in 1808, in a note to Glaze vs.
-Drayton,Vol. 1, p. 109, of his reports, a case decided in 1784,
says: "The Legislature, in consideration of the distressed state of
the country after the war, (Revolutionary War,) had passed an act
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preventing the immediate recovery of debts, and fixing certain
periods for the payment of debts far beyond the period fixed by
the contract of 'the parties. These interferences with private contracts became very common with most of the State Legislatures,
even after the distress arising from the war had ceased in a great
degree. They produced distrust and irritation throughout the
community, to such an extent that new troubles were apprehended,
and nothing contributed more to prepare the public mind for
giving up a portion of the State sovereignty, and adopting an
efficient national government, than these abuses of power by the
State Legislature." See, also, on this point, Rawle on the Constitution, and Sergeant's Constitutional Law.
We have been controlled, in coming to our conclusion, by the
decisions bearing upon the question latest made by the Supreme
Court of the United States. We may most safely, we think, presume that that court will follow, and not depart from, those decisions. Should such be the case, it would be detrimental to the
public should this court decide the redemption law operative upon
existing contracts, thus leaving debtors to suffer their lands to be
sold upon the faith of a right to redeem, which the Supreme Court
might take away; while, should this court decide against the redemption, it will put debtors on their guard to take care of their
property; and should the Supreme Court afterwards decide in
favor of redemption, the decision of this court will not have
worked harm to any great extent.
The judgment is reversed, cause remanded, &c.

In the Supreme Court of .PennSylvania,1862.
ROBERT FORSYTH VS. DEBORAH WELLS.
1. Trover will lie to recover the value of coal dug by the owner of land, through a
mistake of boundaries, out of adjoining land.
2. The measure of damages in such action, there being no wrongful purpose, will

from
be the fair value of the coal in place, as if on a purchase of the coal field
the phaintiff, and not its value when mined.

15

FORSYTH vs. WELLS.

This was an action of trover. The parties to the suit were
owners of adjoining coal tracts. The defendant had, some years
before, opened a mine or drift in his own land, near the dividing
line, and had at last worked through into the plaintiff's land, as
it was alleged, and dug out her coal. The action was brought for
the conversion of this coal.
That there was, in fact, any encroachment, was denied by the
defendant, and it was further contended on his behalf, at the trial
of the case, that whatever other remedy the plaintiff might have,
this was not the proper form of action in which to try a question of
title or boundary. The judge below, however, charged the jury in
substance, that if the defendant was not at the time of the taking
of the coal in actual adverse possession of the locus in quo, under
claim of title, but merely worked into his neighbor's land through
a mistake of the true boundary line, trover would lie, and that he
would be obliged to account therein for the value of the coal.
On the question of damages, it was urged by the defendant, that
if he was liable at all in this form of action, it would only be for
the value of the coal in tiLe ground, before he had expended any
labor in preparing it for market. On the other hand, it was
claimed by the plaintiff, and the judge so charged, that the measure of damages was the value of the coal when dug, or what was
called knocked down, in the bank; the difference between these
two modes of estimation being more than one in eight.
The jury having found for the plaintiff in the sum of $775, this
writ of error was taken.
For the plaintiff in error, it was argued by Kaine, that the real
matter in dispute was as to the position of a boundary line, and
this was a question of title which could not be decided in a transitory action like that of trover: Brown vs. Caldwell, 10 Serg. & R.
118; Mather vs. Trinity Church, 3 Serg. & R. 509; -Powell vs.
Smith, 5 Watts, 127.
But admitting that the coal taken really did belong to the plaintiff below, the measure of damages is only what it would have been
worth on the purchase from him of a coal leave, that is, of the right
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to dig and mine it out of her land: Bank of Montgomery vs.
Reese, 2 Casey, 146; Hughes vs. Stevens, 12 Casey, 322. According to that standard, her loss by the defendant's mistake did not
amount to $50, whereas under the ruling of the Court she recovered
nearly $800, which included the cost and expense of preparing
the bank and digging the coal. Even if the coal is to be considered as a personal chattel for which trover would lie, surely the
defendant cannot be obliged to pay for the labor which he himself
has expended in reducing it into that condition.
For the defendant in error it was argued that if trover would
lie at all for coal severed from the realty, the measure of damages
must be the value of the coal when brought into that state or condition which makes it personalty, and the subject of a conversion.
Such was the decision in Martin vs. Porter,8 M. & W. 351, and
in Wild vs. Hott, 9 M. & W. 672; and the case of Baker vs.
Wheeler, 8 Wend. 505, as to trees manufactured into boards, is
still stronger. And see the opinion of Chief Justice Gibson in
Wright vs. Grier, 9 Watts, 172.
That trover will lie for a chattel severed from the land cannot
now be denied: Hargrave's Co. Litt. 218, b., n. 2; Wright vs.
Grier, ut supra; Harlanvs. Harlan, 15 Penn. St. 507; Ferrand
vs. Thompson, 5 B. & Ald. 826; Moers vs. Wait, 3 Wend. 104.
There was no real dispute as to the true boundary line; but if
there had been, it was immaterial. Where a question of title arises
incidentally, it may be tried in a transitory action. The true rule,
as deduced from our cases, seems to be, that where there is an
actual, visible, and notorious adverse possession, a party shall not
be allowed to try his title in a transitory action, but must first
establish his right by ejectment, and then proceed for mesne profits;
but where there is no such possession, bit a mere solitary trespass,
or any number of trespasses, the owner may bring a personal transitory action, and if the defendant disputes the title, it must necessarily be tried in that action: Mather vs. Trinity Church, ut
supra; -Jlliottvs. Powoell, 10 Watts, 453; Harlan vs. Harlan,ut
supra; Wright vs. Grier, ut supra.
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The opinion of the Court was delivered by
C. J.-We are to assume that it was by mistake that
the defendant below went beyond his line in mining his coal, and
mined and carried away some of the plaintiff's coal, and it is fully
settled, that for this trover lies: 3 S. & ER.515; 9 Watts, 172; 8
Barr, 294; 9 Id. 343; 9 Casey, 251.
What, then, is the measure of damages? The plaintiff insists
that because the action is allowed for the coal as personal property,
that is, after it had been mined, or severed from the realty, therefore, by necessary logical sequence, she is entitled to the value of
the coal as it lay in the pit after it had been mined, and so it was
decided below. It is apparent that this transfers to the plaintiff
all the defendant's labor in mining the coal, and thus gives her
more than compensation for the injury done.
Yet we admit the accuracy of the conclusion, if we may properly
base our reasoning on the form, rather than on the principle or
purpose of the remedy. But this we may not do, and especially
we may not sacrifice the principle to the very form by which we
are seeking its enforcement. Principles can never be rectified
without forms, and are often inevitably embarrassed by unfitting
ones; but still the fact, that the form is for the sake of the principle, and not the principle for the form, requires that the form shall
serve, not rule the principle, and must adapt itself to its office.
Just compensation in special classes of cases is the principle of
the action of trover, and a little study will show that it is no
unyielding form, but adapts itself to a great variety of circumstances. In its original purpose and in strict form, it is an action
for personal property lost by one and found by another, and converted to his own use. But it is not thus restricted in practice;
for it is continually applied to every form of wrongful conversion,
and of taking and conversion, and affords a compensation, not
only for the value of the goods, but also for outrage and malice
in the taking and detention of them: 6 Serg. & R. 426; 12 Id. 93;
3 Watts, 333.
Thus form yields to purpose for the sake of completeness of
remedy. Even the action of replevin adapts itself thus: 1 Jones.
LOWRIE,
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881, and so does trespass: 7 Casey, 456. In very strict form,
trespass is the proper remedy for a wrongful taking of personal
property, and for cutting timber, or quarrying stone, or digging
coal on another's land, and carrying it away; and yet the trespass
may be waived, and trover maintained, without giving up any claim
for any outrage or violence in the act of taking: 3 Barr, 13. It
is quite apparent, therefore, that this form of action is not so uniformly rigid in its administration as to force upon us any given or
arbitrary measure of compensation. It is simply a form of reaching a just compensation for the goods lost. Where there is no
fraud or violence, or malice, this is enough: 11 Casey, 28.
Where the taking and conversion are one act, or one continual
series of acts, trespass is the more obvious and proper remedy, but
the law allows the waiver of the taking, so that the party may sue
in trover; and this is often convenient. Sometimes it is even
necessary, because the plaintiff, with full proof of the conversion,
may fail to prove the taking by the defendant. But when the law
does allow this departure from strict form, it is not in order to
enable the plaintiff, by his own choice of actions, to increase his
recovery beyond just compensation, but only to give a more convenient form of recovering that much.
Our case raises a question of taking by mere mistake, because
of the uncertainty of boundaries, and we must confine ourselves to
this. The many conflicting opinions on the measure of damages
in cases of wilful wrong, and especially the very learned and
thoughtful opinions in the case of Silsbury vs. McCoon, 4 Denio,
332, and 3 Comst. 379, warn us to be careful how we express ourselves on that subject.
We do find cases of trespass where judges have adopted a mode
',of calculating damages for taking coals, that is substantially equivalent to the rule laid dowR by the Common Pleas in this case,
even where no wilful wrong was done, unless the taking of .the
coal out by the plaintiff's entry was regarded as such. But even
then, we cannot avoid feeling that there is a taint of arbitrariness
in such a mode of calculation, because it does not truly mete out
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just compensation: 5 Mees. & W. 351; 9 ..a. 572; 2 Queen's B.
283; and see 28 Eng. L. & E. R. 175.
We prefer the rule in WVood vs. Korewood, 3 Queen's B. 440,
note, where Parke, B., decided, in a case of trover for taking coals,
that if the defendant acted fairly and honestly, in the full belief
of his right, then the measure of damages is the fair value of the
coals as if the coal field had been purchased from the plaintiff.
See, also, Bainbridge on Mines and Minerals, 510; 17 Pick. 1.
Where the defendant's conduct, measured by the standard of
ordinary morality and care, which is the standard of the law, is
not chargeable with fraud, violence, malice, or wilful negligence
or wrong, the value of the property taken and converted is the
measure of just compensation. If raw material has, after appropriation, and without such wrong, been changed by manufacture
into a new species of property, as grain into whiskey, grapes into
wine, furs into hats, hides into leather, or trees into timber, the
law either refues the action of trover for the new article, or limits
the recovery to the value of the original article: 6 Hill, 425, and
note; 21 Barbour, 92; 23 Conn. 523; 38 Maine, 174.
Where there is no wrongful purpose or wrongful negligence in
the defendant, compensation for the real injury done is the purpose
of all remedies; and so long as we bear this in mind we shall have
but little difficulty in managing the forms of actions so as to secure
a fair result. If the defendant in this case was guilty of no intentional wrong, he ought not to have been charged with the value of
the coal after he had been at the expense of mining it, but only
with its value in place, with such other damage to the land as his
mining may have caused. Such would manifestly be the measure
in an action of trespass for mesne profits: 7 Casey, 456.
Judgment reversed, and a new trial awarded.
READ,

J., dissented.

